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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD,

Case No. 20041023-SC

Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review State v. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, 100
P.3d 267, (opinion attached in Addendum A), which reversed the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea (ruling attached in Addendum B).
Jurisdiction exists under UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) & 78-2-2(5) (West 2004).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
During the plea colloquy the trial court was alerted that defendant had recently
consumed alcohol, but defendant assured the court that he was not under the influence and
he exhibited no signs of impairment.

Did rule 11 nonetheless require the trial court to ask defendant how much alcohol he
had consumed andwhen before it couldfindthat defendant's guiltyplea was knowingly entered?
On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision
of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). The court of appeals'
decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, *[f 8, 13 P.3d 576. The
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. State v. Corwell, 2005
UT 28, If 10,

P.3d

(quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 9, 22 P.3d 1242). "The

question of' [w]hether the [district] court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness.'" Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statute and rule, set forth in Addendum C, are relevant:
§ 77-13-6 (1999 & Supp. 2002), and
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).
UTAH CODE ANN.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
Charge. Defendant was charged with driving under the influence with priors, a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1998 & Supp. 2003). R3-4.
Guilty plea. On 18 September 2002, defendant pled guilty as charged. R41:10 (a
copy of the plea hearing is attached in Addendum B). The trial court informed defendant of
the nature of the DUI charge and what the State would have to prove if he went to trial.
R41:4-5. Defendant responded, "Yes, sir," when asked if he understood. Id. The court also
2

reviewed the constitutional rights defendant would be waiving by pleading guilty. R41:6.
Again defendant affimiatively responded, "I understand that." R41:7. When the court asked
if he was "under the influence of alcohol or drugs here today in court," defendant responded,
"Ho." Id.
The trial court next asked defendant if he had had enough time to talk to attorney,
Tony Miles. Defendant responded that he had not in fact talked to attorney Miles. Id.
Attorney Miles then stepped forward and informed the trial court that attorney Allen,
defendant's appointed attorney, had had to leave and that he was "standing in." Id. When
asked if he had had enough time to talk with attorney Allen, defendant responded
affirmatively. Id.
The trial court also asked if defendant was then on parole or probation, which
defendant denied. Id. The court then explained the potential sentence: a zero-to-five-year
prison term, a $ 5,000 fine and an 85% surcharge. R41:7-8. When asked if he had any
questions about the potential sentence, defendant responded, "No, sir." R41:8.
Finally, the court asked if defendant required more time to discuss the case with
anyone. Id. Defendant said that he was "in charge of a bunch of livestock on the mountain"
and that he would "like to have at least a couple of days to, at least two days to get them
down and find somebody to take care of, take care of the animals" if he pled guilty. Id. The
prosecutor interj ected that the parties' plea agreement included her request that defendant "be
taken into custody" that day, "otherwise [defendant] would have been felony on a felony."

3

Id. The prosecutor also expressed concern that defendant had been drinking because she
could "smell it" on him. Id.
When the trial court asked defendant about his earlier denial of being under the
influence, defendant admitted that he had been drinking "earl[ier] [that] morning55 due to a
"back problem/' but continued to maintain that he was "not under the influence." R41:9.
Defendant also reiterated his concern etbout having time to find someone to care for his
livestock. Id. The court said he could make no "guarantee" and asked if that would make
a difference to defendant's decision to plead guilty. R41:9-10. Defendant said, "Notreally,"
and again requested time to find someone to care for his livestock. R41:10.
Defendant then pled guilty as charged. Id. Pursuant to the parties' plea agreement,
the court dismissed another pending DUl charge. Id. The court also had defendant taken
into custody: "I understand your situation, but this is just too dangerous to leave you out with
this kind of a situation." R41:14.
Sentence. The trial court imposed a 0-5 year term of imprisonment on 23 October
2002. R7.
Motion to withdraw guilty plea. Defendant timely moved to withdraw his guilty
plea, alleging that he was "intoxicated at the time the guilty plea was entered." R25. Oral
argument on the motion was heard on 5 March 2003. R41:5 9-67 (a copy of the hearing is
attached in Addendum B). Before hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court indicated that
it had reviewed the videotape of defendant's plea hearing. R41:61. Defense counsel

4

cursorily asserted that defendant "not only had [] been drinking but he was, had been
drinking a sufficient quantity to be intoxicated and didn't understand what he was doing" at
the plea hearing." R41:63. The prosecutor responded that the videotape of the plea hearing
showed that defendant "was definitely coherent and answered [the court's] questions. He a
[sic], responds appropriately. He doesn't seem to be swaying. There's nothing evident on
the tape that would support [defendant's] position now that he was intoxicated." Id.
Following the parties' arguments, defendant was given an opportunity to address the
court. R41:64. Defendant said that "the officer that was here when I was arrested said[,]
'[Y]ou've not only been drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years,' and he
said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and took me downstairs." Id. The court
responded that the "real question [was] not whether [defendant] had been drinking, but []
whether or not [he was] intoxicated, whether [he was] so impaired that [he] didn't understand
what [he] was doing at the time [he] stood here in court and entered a guilty plea. That's,
that's the real issue here." Id. Defendant replied that "after [he] sobered up [he] understood
how [he] messed up," and that he "should have never done that." Id. The trial court observed
that there was "no doubt that [defendant had] been drinking. . . . But, [] the question [was]
whether or not [defendant] had consumed so much alcohol that [he] didn't appreciate, [] or
understand what [he was] doing at the time [he] entered [his] plea[:] And, and that's why I
looked at the tape again." R41:65-66.

5

Motion to withdraw guilty plea denied. The trial court then denied defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and entered the following findings:
. . . [A]s I look at the tape I don't see anything on the, the tape that
suggests to me that you were impaired. And I didn't notice anything at the
time we took the plea. I mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see
wavering or, or having trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, you
seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to you and your answers
appeared to be articulate and coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had
something to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your ability
to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did.
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. I'm also going to find
that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing. And you may have
been drinking, but I just don't think that you were under the influence of an
[sic] alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of understanding what
was going on that day.
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, sir, to withdraw the
plea. And we'll leave the sentence imposed.
R41:66 (a copy is also attached in Addendum B).
Appeal. On appeal, defendant argued "that he was under the influence of alcohol at
the time he entered his plea; that the trial court failed to adequately ensure that his guilty plea
was knowing and voluntary after the judge had notice of his alcohol consumption the
morning of the plea hearing; and that the trial court erred in denying his subsequent motion
to withdraw his plea." Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, ^ 5. A majority of the court of appeals
agreed with defendant and reversed the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. Id. at1! 12. The Beckstead majority reversed even though defendant himself had
assured the trial court that, although he had been drinking earlier that morning he was not
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under the influence, and even though defendant exhibited no signs of impairment during the
plea colloquy. Id. at \ 9-11. Notwithstanding the total absence of any evidence of
impairment, the Becksteadma^oxity refused to uphold the trial court's ruling because the trial
court had not asked defendant at the plea hearing how much alcohol he had consumed and
when. Id. atfflf10-12. Although nothing in rule 11 requires these questions, the majority
reasoned "such a duty does arise upon the court's becoming aware that a defendant has been
drinking prior to the hearing or otherwise may be impaired." Id. at \ 10. In the absence of
this questioning, the Beckstead majority opined that the trial court "did not strictly comply
with its rule 11 obligations, and should have allowed [defendant] to withdraw his plea." Id.
at T|ll.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Becks tead majority holds that rule 11 requires trial courts to ask about the amount
and timing of a defendant's recent alcohol consumption—where such is brought to the trial
court's attention during the plea colloquy—even if, as here, the defendant assures the trial
court that he is "not under the influence," and'that assurance is bom out by the defendant's
lucid plea colloquy performance. The Becksteadmajority's holding is inconsistent with this
Court's consistent teaching that guilty plea proceedings should not be formalistic. It is also
unsupported. Contrary to the Beckstead majority, most courts are less concerned with
formalistic inquiry than with determining whether the record as a whole actually supports a
finding of non-impairment. In doing so, they commonly rely, as here, on a defendant's
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assurances of non-impairment that are buttressed by the defendant's plea hearing behavior.
The Court should therefore overrule Becks teadand correct the majority's departure from this
Court's policy-based interpretation of rule 11.
ARGUMENT
WHEN A TRIAL COURT IS ALERTED THAT A DEFENDANT HAS
RECENTLY CONSUMED ALCOHOL, AND WHERE, AS HERE, THE
DEFENDANT EXHIBITS NO SIGNS OF IMPAIRMENT, RULE 11
DOES NOT REQUIRE THE COURT TO ASK HOW MUCH
ALCOHOL WAS CONSUMED AND WHEN BEFORE IT MAY
ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA AS KNOWINGLY ENTERED
As recounted above, defendant pled guilty to felony DUI. R41:10. Although he
admitted having consumed alcohol earlier that morning, defendant denied being under the
influence and he exhibited no signs of impairment.

See R41:3-14.

The trial court

accordingly rejected defendant's subsequent motion to withdraw his guilty plea, wherein
defendant alleged that he was too intoxicated at the plea hearing to know what he was doing.
See R41:61 -67. In Beckstead, a majority of the court of appeals reversed, holding that where,
as here, a trial court is alerted that the defendant has recently consumed alcohol, the trial
court must at minimum ask how much alcohol was consumed and when before it may accept
the defendant's guilty plea as knowingly entered under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Id. at \ 10. The majority opinion is inconsistent with this Court's repeated
teaching that the substantive goal of rule 11—that defendants know their rights and
understand the consequences of their plea—"should not be overshadowed or undermined by
formalistic ritual." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, U 11, 22 P.3d 1242. See also State v.
8

Corwell, 2005 UT 28, \ 17,

P.3d

(quoting Visser). Beckstead should therefore be

overruled.
Guilty plea standard. "Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the
entry of guilty pleas." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, U 11. Rule 11 "provides in part, that a district
court may not accept a guilty plea unless the court finds that the defendant has voluntarily
entered the plea," and "knows o f the specific constitutional rights he or she is giving up.
Id. (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), (quotation omitted)). Thus, "'[t]he substantive goal
of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic
consequences of their decision to plead guilty.5" Id. (quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^f 11). "To
accomplish this goal, [this Court] has placed the burden of complying with rule 11(e) on the
district courts, requiring them to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly
knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his
or her constitutional rights.5" Id. (internal quotations omitted). See also State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309, 1311, 1313 (Utah 1987). The Court "describe[s] this burden as a duty of
strict compliance.55 Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ^J11 (case citation and internal quotation omitted).1

i

At the time defendant entered his guilty plea in 2002, a guilty plea could only be withdrawn
for "good cause." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (1999 & Supp. 2002). Utah courts have
held that failure to strictly comply with rule 11 is "good cause.55 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 812
P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991). Section 77-13-6 was amended effective May 2003 to
allow for withdrawal of a guilty plea only "upon a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.55 Because the amendment became effective after defendant entered his
plea, this brief cites only to the former statute and applicable case law construing that statute.
9

"Strict compliance with rule 11(e)," however, "does not require that a district court
follow a 'particular script5 or any other 'specific method of communicating the rights
enumerated by rule 11.'" Id at 112 (quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88, % 13). Rather, "'strict
compliance can be accomplished by multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is
omitted and so long as the record reflects that the requirement has been fulfilled.'" Id.
(quoting State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1992)). Further, "[b]ecause strict
compliance may be accomplished through a variety of means, the question of whether a
defendant was provided with a sufficient understanding of rule 11(e) rights 'necessarily
turn[s] on the facts of each case.'" Id. (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore, "the test of
whether a district court strictly complies with rule 11(e) is . . . whether the record adequately
supports the district court's conclusion that the defendant had a conceptual understanding of
each of the elements of rule 11(e)." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, ^f 18. Finally, where, as here, a
plea colloquy strictly complies with rule 11, there is a presumption that the plea was
knowingly entered. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 11, 1 P.3d 1108.
This case. Contrary to the Beckstead majority's view, the instant record amply
supports the trial court's findings that it strictly complied with rule 11 in accepting
defendant's guilty plea and that defendant's plea was knowingly entered, even though
defendant had consumed alcohol earlier that day. See R41:65-66 (ruling); see also R41:3-14
(guilty plea). As set forth above, defendant was not initially forthcoming about his recent
alcohol consumption and also responded negatively to the trial court's initial inquiry as to
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whether he was "under the influence of alcohol or drugs[.]" R41:7. After the prosecutor
indicated that defendant smelled like he had been drinking, defendant acknowledged that he
had consumed alcohol earlier that morning for a "back problem/' but also reiterated that he
was "not under the influence[.]" R41:9.
Defendant's assertions of non-impairment were consistent with his behavior during
the plea colloquy. His statements during the colloquy were responsive and appropriate
throughout. See, e.g., R41:3-14. For example, defendant responded affirmatively when the
trial court asked if he wanted to waive his right to a preliminary hearing and to enter a guilty
plea. R41:5. Defendant specifically pointed out that his decision to plead guilty was based
on "the deal we made with the prosecution." R41:4; see also R41:5. Defendant also affirmed
that he understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. R41:6-7
("I understand that"). When the trial court asked defendant if he had had "enough time to
talk to Mr. Miles (defendant's attorney) about this," defendant appropriately pointed out that
he had not talked to attorney Miles. R41:7. Attorney Miles then explained to the trial court
that he was "standing in" for attorney Allen, who had had to leave. Id. The trial court asked
whether defendant had had enough time to speak with attorney Allen and defendant
responded, "Yes, sir." Id.

Defendant also affirmed that he had no questions about the

potential sentence. R41:8.
When the trial court asked defendant if he required "any more time to talk to anyone
about the case," defendant indicated that he was concerned about "livestock on the

11

mountain/5 for which he was responsible. Id. Defendant said he would "like to have at least
a couple of days to, at least two days to get them down and find somebody to take care of,
take care of the animals [.]" Id. The trial court initially responded that defendant would not
be sentenced that day and thus would have "some time," but the prosecutor interjected that
"the agreement that [she] had with Mr. Allen was that [she] was going to ask that [defendant]
be taken into custody today." Id. It was at this point that the prosecutor pointed out that she
could smell alcohol on defendant's person, and that defendant acknowledged consuming
alcohol earlier in the day, but reiterated that he was "not under the influence." R41:9.
When the trial court asked if there was "anything else we need to cover before we take
the plea," defendant again raised his concern about finding someone to care for his livestock.
Id. The trial court said it would not "make [defendant] a guarantee," and asked defendant
if that would "make a difference" to his decision to plead guilty. Id. Defendant replied, "Not
really[,]" and reiterated that he did not "have anybody to, to take care of [his livestock].
That's all, that's all I'm worried about is the cattle." R41:10. Defendant thereafter pled
guilty to felony DUL Id. The trial court accepted his plea and, pursuant to the parties'
agreement, dismissed another pending DUI charge. Id.
Following defendant's guilty plea, the prosecutor requested that he be taken into
custody, "[otherwise, [defendant] would be out on a felony on a felony and we could have
just tried that other case next week. I know he wants time to handle this livestock problem.
But frankly, I think in the interests of safety of the public he be taken into custody." R41:11.

12

Defendant reiterated his request for one or two days to make arrangements for the care of his
livestock:
I've got to go, I've got to go out to (inaudible word) valley and find out if I can
get the co-owner, co-owner to take over his share of them, I guess. I know this
is, this is . . . I hadn't expected this. I expected to go to Harrisville and (short
inaudible, away from mic) down there to a Class B misdemeanor, which is
what they offered me. And (short indecipherable, away mic) right off the top
of my head I don't know what I'm going to do here.
R41:11-12. Upon further questioning from the trial court, defendant explained that he had
no family or friends that could assist him. R41:12. The trial court indicated its concern that
defendant had committed a DUI offense while he was "out awaiting trial" on a prior DUI:
"And now you show up in my court drinking. I mean, you are an absolute time bomb, aren't
you. If I, if I let you go aren't I being a little remiss?"/<i. Defendant responded, "Your
Honor, all I'm asking is 48 hours (short inaudible, two speakers). . . . And this was part of
the agreement which I've made with the prosecution, that I'd have time to take care of this."
R41:12-13. The trial court reiterated its concern about defendant's conduct in committing
a new DUI while out on bail for a prior DUI: "I'm kind of trying to figure out how, why I
should let you go is what I'm concerned about." R41:13. Defendant asserted that he was
"not thinking of [himself,]" and further indicated that he had not driven to court that day.
Id. After attorney Miles indicated that his understanding of the plea agreement was
consistent with what the prosecutor had represented, the trial court revoked defendant's bail
and had him taken into custody. R41:14. Not one to give up, defendant asked unsuccessfully
for a "furlow for 24 hours, to get out for 24 hours[.]" Id.
13

Analysis. Based on the above summary of defendant's plea colloquy performance,
"the record adequately supports the [trial] court's conclusion thai [] defendant had a
conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule 11(e)." Corwell, 2005 UT 28, % 18.
Defendant's answers were all responsive to the questions put before him. The trial judge,
who observed defendant's demeanor both at the plea hearing and later on the videotape of
the plea hearing—at the motion to withdraw hearing—saw nothing in defendant's demeanor
to make him think that defendant was intoxicated or that his earlier drinking had impaired
him to the point that he could not understand the plea agreement or its consequences. In
other words, the trial court's findings, that it strictly complied with rule 11 in accepting
defendant's guilty plea and that defendant's plea was knowingly entered—even though
defendant had consumed alcohol earlier that day—are well supported by the record. See
R41:65-66.
Notwithstanding the above, the Beckstead majority held that the instant record is
"insufficient" to support the trial court's findings because no inquiry was made as to the
amount and timing of defendant's alcohol consumption. Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, ^f
9. Without citing any supporting authority, the Becksteadmajority holds that where, as here,
a trial court is alerted that the defendant consumed alcohol "just prior to the plea hearing" the
trial court must probe the timing and quantity of the alcohol consumed in order to strictly
comply with rule 11. Id. at ^ 10. The Beckstead majority further asserts, again without any
authority, that "[tjhese inquiries represent the minimum inquiry necessary to quantify the
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defendant's state of inebriation and create an informed opinion as to the defendant's capacity
to enter aplea.'Vd. (emphasis in original). According to the Becksteadmajority, defendant's
assurances that he was not under the influence andhis non-impaired behavior during the plea
colloquy were "insufficient" to satisfy rule 11 because "of the well-known tendency of
persons to understate their alcohol intake and level of intoxication to representatives of the
justice system," and because "there is no shortage of cases demonstrating that people with
alcohol problems are often capable of appearing to be sober when in fact they are not." Id.
at Tffl 8-9. Neither of the Beckstea d majority's assertions, however, succeeds in undermining
the trial court's well-placed reliance on defendant's assurances that he was "not under the
influence," see R41:7,9, because defendant's assurances were buttressed by the trial court's
own observations of defendant's lucid plea colloquy performance.
Indeed, other courts routinely rely on defendants' representations of non-impairment
where, as here, those representations are consistent with the defendants' coherent conduct.
Moreover, other courts do so, even though they also recognize that the better practice may
be to identify the drug or intoxicant in question, its likely effects, how much was consumed,
and when. For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that "[w]hen a
defendant in a Rule 11 hearing confirms that he is on medication," "the 'better practice' is
to identify the drug in question, how recently it has been taken and in what quantity, and the
drug's purpose and effect." Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47, 52-53 (1 st Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 2000)). But, the First
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Circuit also recognizes that "practical judgments can usually be made[5] and that "[cjourts
have commonly relied on the defendant's own assurance . . . that the defendant's mind is
clear[,]" and that "the defendant's own performance in the course of a colloquy may confirm
. . . his assurances." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 268-269. Thus, although the SavinonAcosta court "would have been more comfortable if the district court had been able to
ascertain the name of the tranquilizer and the quantity" Savinon-Acosta had consumed,
Savinon-Acosta assured the district court that he was not impaired: "'No. No. I understand
perfectly.'" Id. at 269. Savinon-Acosta's assurance, together with his lucid performance
during the plea colloquy—which "bore out [his] claim of clearheadedness"—thus sufficed
to satisfy rule 11 in that case. Id Accord United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 754 (10th
Cir. 1995) (upholding Browning's guilty plea where he assured court that his medication
"had not" "affected [his] ability to think or comprehend" and record was devoid of evidence
"that his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea was affected by the medications");
United States v. Vaughan, 13 F.3d 1186, 1187 (8th Cir.) (rejecting Vaughan's claim that his
mental condition prevented him from entering a knowing guilty plea where Vaughan had
"denied that he was under the influence of 'anything, medication or otherwise' that would
make it difficult for him to understand why he was pleading guilty," and where Vaughan's
"sworn statements were lucid, articulate, and inconsistent with his claim that he did not enter
a knowing and intelligent plea"), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 1094 (1994); United States v.
Dalman, 994 F.2d 537,538-539 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding Dalman's guilty plea where, even
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though he was "taking four different types of pills," Dalman assured court that he understood
what was happening "'right now'"); Froistadv. State, 641 N.W.2d 86, 95-96 (N.D. 2002)
(upholding guilty plea where Froistad assured trial court that prescribed medication he was
taking did not affect his "thinking faculties" and "nothing in the record [] indicate[d] that
Froistad was confused or unaware of what was taking place during the proceeding"); State
v. Mink, 805 N.E.2d 1064, 1076-1077 (Ohio 2004) (upholding guilty plea where Mink
assured trial court "that [his] medication had no effect on his ability to understand the court's
proceedings"); State v. Ries, 849 P.2d 184, 186 (Mont. 1993) (upholding guilty plea where
Ries denied taking any medication "at the moment" and affirmed that his "mind" was
"clear").
Courts are understandably less willing to uphold guilty pleas as knowingly entered
where—unlike this case—the defendants' prior medical history or less-than-lucid plea
hearing behavior calls for a more probing and clarifying inquiry, which is not conducted. For
example, the First Circuit remanded in United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588, 591-592
(1st Cir. 1991), for further findings as to the affect of medication Parra-Ibanez ingested
where, prior to the plea, Parra-Ibanez "revealed a history of psychiatric treatment and drug
abuse sufficient to justify a psychiatric evaluation for competency," and also exhibited, postplea, a "serious emotional disturbance, including [] attempting] suicide" and experiencing
"seizures." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269 (distinguishing result in Parra-Ibanez). See
also United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 562 (4th Cir. 1999) (remanding for the district
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court to determine whether antidepressants Damon was taking as a result of a recent suicide
attempt "had the capacity to impair his judgment"), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1170 (2002);
Szermiv. State, 862 So.2d 935,936 (Fla. App. 2004) (vacating guilty plea where Szermi both
denied being "under the influence of [] mind altering drugs at [the] time" of the guilty plea,
and also affirmed that the medications he was then taking "significantly affectfed his]
reasoning or thinking ability").
Additionally, courts have been unwilling to uphold a guilty plea even though the
defendant's plea hearing behavior suggests no impairment, if—unlike this case—there is no
on-the-record affirmation from the defendant that he or she was unaffected by a recent
ingestion of medication. See, e.g., United States v. Rosillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1065 (2nd Cir.
1988) (vacating guilty plea where trial court failed to elicit a response from Rosillo—whom
the court knew to have a heart condition—that he was not under the influence of any
medication); United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43, 46 (3rd Cir. 1987) (vacating guilty plea
where trial court "failed to pursue the issue of Cole's state of mind," after being informed
that Cole ingested drugs the night before).
While there is no "settled rule," the primary concern in all these cases is not so much
with the "precise names and quantities of drugs" consumed, but rather, with whether the
record supports a finding of non-impairment. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269. Indeed,
Savinon-Acosta observes that the First Circuit's case law is "in general terms ... not unlike"
that of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in "[] Dalman, 994 F.2d [at] 538-539[], where
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[Dalman] was unable to tell the district court the names of the drugs he was taking but
confirmed that he understood what was happening; and his performance in the colloquy bore
out his assertion." Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269. See e.g., Cody, 249 F.3d at 52-53
(upholding Cody's guilty plea where his "appearance and demeanor as he answered questions
throughout the colloquy" were consistent with his "assurances" that lithium he was taking
did not "affect [his] train of thought or anything"); Miranda-Gonzalez v. United States, 181
F.3d 164, 166-167 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding Miranda-Gonzalez's guilty plea where he
denied that unidentified pills he took earlier that morning "affected his . . . ability to
understand [the] proceedings").
The courts discussed above thus generally recognize, that while a defendant's
assertions as to the amount and timing of previously ingested medication or alcohol may be
enlightening in some circumstances, they are no substitute for a trial court's objective
assessment of demeanor and responsiveness during a thorough plea colloquy as the one
conducted here. "Rather than defer to the trial court's firsthand observations of Defendant's
conduct" during the plea colloquy, however, the Becksteadmajority, "would graft additional
requirements into the rule 11 colloquy when a trial court is on notice that a defendant has
been drinking alcohol prior to a plea hearing." Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, \ 20 (Davis,
J., dissenting). The problem with the Beckstead majority's approach, as pointed out by the
dissent, is that it "fails to define what those requirements would be or to explain why they
would be appropriate[,]" or helpful, particularly given the majority's recognition of the
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"' well-known tendency of persons to understate their alcohol intake and level of intoxication
when asked by representatives of the justice system.5" Id. Indeed, "[e]ven if there were
some basis for [the majority's] assertion," it supports the notion that further inquiry into
[defendant's sobriety, against the backdrop of a thorough rule 11 colloquy," as here, "would
have revealed little." Id.
As further observed by the Beckstead dissent, "the majority points out that the court
'tookno steps to determine [defendant's] level ofintoxication[,]'" but u[t]he majority, [] fails
to demonstrate a legal relationship between the amount of alcohol consumed by a defendant
and his ability to make a knowing and voluntary plea." 2004 UT App 338, f 21. Neither of
the two cases cited by the Beckstead majority for its proposition that "people with alcohol
problems are often capable of appearing to be sober when in fact they are not," has anything
to do with issues of competency like that here. See State v. Burradell, 931 S. W.2d 100 (Ark.
1996) (upholding contempt citation against defendant who appeared in court smelling of
alcohol and registered a .13 on the breath test, but who displayed no outward signs of
intoxication); Cole v. State, 493 S.2d 1333 (Miss. 1986) (holding that there was no probable
cause to warrant blood alcohol test; thus, test result inadmissible). Moreover, the Burradell
court expressly noted that it was unconcerned with "the effect of intoxication on a
defendant's competence or the voluntariness of his actions." Id. at 103.
Finally, "[e]ven if a blood-alcohol level were available" here, the dissent correctly
points out that "the majority's standard does not demonstrate how a trial court, without
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relying on observation, could determine when a defendant is so intoxicated that he cannot
make a knowing and voluntary plea." Beckstead, 2004 UT App 338, f 21. Indeed,
defendant's lucid responses throughout the undisputedly thorough colloquy belie the
majority's assumption that his non-impairment could not be accurately assessed unless the
trial court also asked how much alcohol he had consumed and when. See R41:3-14.
CONCLUSION
This Court should overturn Becks tead. The majority's focus on ritualistic inquiries
that the trial court did not make, as opposed to demeanor and other evaluative information
the trial court gleaned from the rule 11 colloquy itself, wholly ignores the focus of the inquiry
in a guilty plea case—the defendant' s knowledge and understanding—in favor of formalistic
inquiry. The Court should thus correct the Becks tead majority's departure from this Court's
policy-based interpretation of rule 11 and its focus on defendants' comprehensive
understanding of the plea. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 18; Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 11;
Maguire, 830 P.2d at 218.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on / ^ M a y 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

VL4JUAN DECKER
'Assistant Attorney General
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Larry Niel BECKSTEAD, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20030217-CA.
Sept. 30, 2004.
Background: Defendant moved to withdraw his
guilty plea to driving under influence of alcohol
(DUI) with prior offenses. The Second District
Court, Ogden Department, Ernie W. Jones, J.,
denied motion. Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held
that:
(1) trial court's reliance on defendant's general
statement that he was not under influence of drugs
or alcohol at time of plea hearing was insufficient to
satisfy its obligations under plea-colloquy rule;
(2) defendant's outward appearance of sobriety at
plea hearing was insufficient to satisfy trial court's
obligations under plea-colloquy rule; and
(3) trial court's finding that defendant had capacity
to enter knowing and voluntary guilty plea lacked
sufficient basis.
Reversed and remanded.

applies a "clearly erroneous" standard for the trial
court's findings of fact made in conjunction with
that decision.
[3] Criminal Law €=>1134(3)
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
In the context of plea colloquies, the ultimate
question of whether the trial court strictly complied
with constitutional and procedural requirements for
entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is
reviewed for correctness. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule
11(e).
[4] Criminal Law €=^273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Rule governing plea colloquies squarely places on
trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and procedural requirements are
complied with when a guilty plea is entered. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e).
[5] Criminal Law €=^273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Strict-compliance rule for plea colloquies requires a
trial court to establish (1) that the defendant's guilty
plea is truly knowing and voluntary and (2) that the
defendant
knowingly
waived his
or her
constitutional rights and understood the elements of
the crime. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e).

Davis, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law € = n i 4 9
1 lOkl 149 Most Cited Cases
Appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.
[2] Criminal Law €=>1158(1)
HOkl 158(1) Most Cited Cases
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, appellate court

[6] Criminal Law €^273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Trial court's reliance on defendant's general
statement that he was not under influence of drugs
or alcohol at time of plea hearing was insufficient to
satisfy its obligations under plea-colloquy rule to
ensure that defendant had capacity to knowingly
and voluntarily enter guilty plea, given that trial
court was placed on notice that defendant had been
drinking prior to plea hearing; there was
well-known tendency of persons to understate their
alcohol intake and level of intoxication to
representatives of justice system. Rules Crim.Proc,
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Before Judges DAVIS, JACKSON, and THORNE.

[7] Criminal Law €==>273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Mere general questions that ask whether a plea is
voluntary are insufficient under rule governing plea
colloquies. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e).
[8] Criminal Law €^273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Defendant's outward appearance of sobriety at plea
hearing was insufficient to
satisfy trial court's obligations under plea-colloquy
rule to ensure that defendant had capacity to
knowingly and voluntarily enter guilty plea, given
that trial court was placed on notice that defendant
had been drinking prior to plea hearing; record
showed that defendant had considerable experience
with alcohol consumption if not substantial drinking
problem, in that defendant pleaded to felony drunk
driving with prior convictions, defendant admitted
that he had been drinking, and prosecutor could
smell alcohol, and people with alcohol problems
were often capable of appearing sober when they
were not. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e).
[9] Criminal Law €^>273.1(4)
110k273.1(4) Most Cited Cases
Trial court's finding that defendant had capacity to
enter knowing and voluntary guilty plea lacked
sufficient basis, given that trial court was on notice
that defendant had been drinking prior to plea
hearing, even though defendant stated that he was
not under influence of drugs or alcohol and had
outward appearance of sobriety; trial court did not
inquire into amount of alcohol that defendant had
consumed or amount of time that had elapsed since
his last drink, which was minimum inquiry
necessary to quantify defendant's state of inebriation
and create informed opinion as to defendant's
capacity to enter plea. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 11(e)
*268 Randall W. Richards, Richards Caine &
Allen, Ogden, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and Marian
Decker, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.

OPINION
THORNE, Judge:
**1 Larry Niel Beckstead pleaded guilty to one
count of driving under the influence of alcohol with
prior offenses, a third-degree felony pursuant to
Utah Code section 41-6-44. See Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44 (1998). Beckstead filed a timely motion to
withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that he was
intoxicated when he entered the plea. The *269
trial court denied Beckstead's motion, and he
appeals. We reverse.
BACKGROUND
**2 Beckstead entered his guilty plea on
September 18, 2002. Pursuant to rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court
conducted a colloquy with Beckstead. As a part of
this colloquy, the trial court asked Beckstead if he
was "under the influence of alcohol or drugs here
today in court," to which Beckstead responded "no."
**3 As the colloquy progressed, the prosecutor
alerted the court that Beckstead had been drinking
and following exchange occurred:
Prosecutor: [F]rankly, [Beckstead has] been
drinking today and a, that concerns me.
Court: You say he has been drinking today?
Prosecutor: I can tell he's been drinking. I can
smell it.
Court: I thought I just asked you Mr.~
Beckstead: Well, it was eairly this morning.
Court: Well, I just asked you if you had had
anything to drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you
said no.
Beckstead: I'm not under the influence, Your
Honor.
Court: Okay. You're nol under the influence of
alcoholBeckstead: No (short inaudible, two speakers)
this morning.
Court:-but you have been drinking.
Beckstead: I have a little bit of a back problem.
Court: Well, I do too but I don't drink to take
care of it[.]
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The court made no further inquiry as to
Beckstead's potential intoxication and accepted his
guilty plea. The court did, however, make two
further references to Beckstead's nshow[ing] up in
my court drinking," and Beckstead's drinking also
appeared to play a role in the court's decision to
take Beckstead into custody following his plea. As
the court stated, "this is just too dangerous to leave
you out with this kind of a situation."
**4 Beckstead filed a timely motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, alleging in part that he was
intoxicated when he entered the plea. [FN1] The
trial court held a hearing on Beckstead's motion,
prior to which the court reviewed the videotape of
Beckstead's plea hearing. Neither side presented
evidence at the hearing, although Beckstead made a
statement wherein he described his experience in
custody following the plea hearing. Beckstead
described an officer telling him that, based on
twenty-five years of law enforcement experience,
his opinion was that Beckstead was very
intoxicated. Beckstead also stated that he believed
he was going to be charged with public intoxication
following the plea hearing. After listening to
Beckstead's comments, the court made the
following statement and findings:
FN1. Beckstead has abandoned all other
grounds for seeking withdrawal of his plea,
and we do not address them here.
[A]s I look at the tape, I don't see anything on the,
the tape that suggests to me that you were
impaired. And I didn't notice anything at the time
we took the plea. I mean, I didn't see slurred
speech, I didn't see wavering or, or having trouble
standing up or talking at all. I mean, you seemed
to understand all of the questions that I put to you
and your answers appeared to be articulate and
coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had
something to drink, I just don't think that that
somehow impaired your ability to enter that plea
on the, on the day that you did.
So I'm going to find that we satisfied [r]ule 11.
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case
was both voluntary and knowing. And you may
have been drinking but I just don't think that you

were under the influence of an alcohol to a degree
that it rendered you incapable of understanding
what was going on that day.
The court then denied Beckstead's motion to
withdraw his plea. Beckstead appeals.
*270 ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3] **5 Beckstead argues that he was under
the influence of alcohol at the time he entered his
plea; that the trial court failed to adequately ensure
that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary after
the judge had notice of his alcohol consumption the
morning of the plea hearing; and that the trial court
erred in denying his subsequent motion to withdraw
his plea. "We review a trial court's denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an
abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Blair, 868
P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993). We apply a " ' "clearly
erroneous" standard for the trial court's findings of
fact made in conjunction with that decision.' " State
v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,^f 10, 983 P.2d 556
(quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah
1996)) (other citation omitted). However, "[i]n the
context of rule 11 colloquies, the 'ultimate question
of whether the trial court strictly complied with
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry
of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed
for correctness.' " State v. Hittle, 2004 UT 46,1f 4,
94 P.3d 268 (quoting Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60 at \
10,983P.2d556).
ANALYSIS
[4][5] **6 The procedures for entering a guilty
plea are set forth in rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See State v. Benvenuto, 1999
UT 60,U 11, 983 P.2d 556. " 'Rule 11(e) squarely
places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and [r]ule 11(e) requirements are
complied with when a guilty plea is entered.' " Id.
(quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312
(Utah 1987)). "This 'strict compliance' rule requires
the trial court to establish (1) that 'the defendant's
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary,' and (2)
that 'the defendant knowingly waived his or her
constitutional rights and understood the elements of
the crime.' " Id. (quoting State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d
993, 995 (Utah 1993)).
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**7 Beckstead's appeal presents the issue of what
steps a trial court must take to ensure that a plea is
knowing and voluntary once the court has been
placed on notice that a defendant has been drinking
alcohol just prior to the plea hearing. In this case,
the court relied on Beckstead's assertion that he was
not under the influence of alcohol, as well as the
apparent absence of outward signs of intoxication,
to determine that his alcohol consumption did not
affect the knowing and voluntary nature of
Beckstead's plea. Under the circumstances of this
case, we cannot agree that this was sufficient.
[6][7] **8 " '[M]ere general questions which ask
whether a plea is "voluntary" are insufficient under
[r]ule 11/ " State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 824 (Utah
Ct.App.1995) (quoting State v. Valencia, 116 P.2d
1332, 1335 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). Similarly, upon
being placed on notice that Beckstead had been
drinking, the trial court's reliance on Beckstead's
general statement that he was "not under the
influence" was insufficient to satisfy its rule 11
obligations to ensure that Beckstead had the
capacity to knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea.
This is particularly true in light of the well-known
tendency of persons to understate their alcohol
intake and level of intoxication to representatives of
the justice system. See, e.g., Roylance v. Davies, 18
Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1967) ("The
defendant admits to a couple of drinks of whiskey.
Hardly anyone ever admits to having taken more."
(Crockett, C.J., dissenting)); see also State v. East,
743 P.2d 1211, 1211 (Utah 1987) (affirming
driving under the influence conviction of driver
who informed police that he had "had a couple of
beers"); Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 879
(Utah 1979) (finding fact question on defendant's
intoxication despite his claim of only having had
"two beers" three hours earlier).
[8] **9 Neither is it sufficient that Beckstead
exhibited no outward signs of intoxication to the
court at the hearing or on the videotape thereof.
Beckstead pleaded guilty to one felony count of
driving under the influence with prior convictions,
and had another felony count of driving under the
influence dismissed pursuant to his plea agreement.
Further, Beckstead admitted that he had been

drinking prior to the plea hearing, and the
prosecutor could smell the alcohol. This record
reflects, at a minimum, a person with some
considerable experience with alcohol *271
consumption, if not a substantial drinking problem.
There is no shortage of cases demonstrating that
people with alcohol problems are often capable of
appearing to be sober when in fact they are not.
See, e.g., Burradell v. State, 326 Ark. 182, 931
S.W.2d 100, 101 (1996) (involving a defendant
who appeared at his plea hearing smelling of
alcohol and registering a .13 on a portable breath
test but otherwise "display [ing] no outward signs of
intoxication"); Cole v. State, 493 So.2d 1333, 1335
(Miss. 1986) (finding no probable cause for blood
test revealing a blood-alcohol level of .246 because
"[n]o aspect of Cole's speech, appearance or
behavior in any way indicated that he was under the
influence of alcohol"). Accordingly, in light of the
trial court's awareness of Beckstead's recent
drinking and criminal history involving alcohol, it
was insufficient to rely primarily on Beckstead's
outward appearance to determine that he was
capable of entering his plea.
[9] **10 " 'What is at stake for an accused facing
[punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of
which courts are capable in canvassing the matter
with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence.' " State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,
1312 (Utah 1987) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
(1969)). While a trial court is not ordinarily
required to inquire beyond a defendant's denial of
drug or alcohol use, such a duty does arise upon the
court's becoming aware that a defendant has been
drinking prior to the hearing or may otherwise be
impaired. Here, the trial court was advised that
Beckstead had been drinking, and Beckstead
admitted as much, yet the court made no inquiry
into the amount of alcohol that Beckstead had
consumed or the amount of time that had elapsed
since his last drink. [FN2] These inquiries
represent the minimum inquiry necessary to quantify
the defendant's state of inebriation and create an
informed opinion as to the defendant's capacity to
enter a plea. Without such supporting facts, the

© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

100P 3d 267

Page 5

100 P 3d 267, 509 Utah Adv Rep 26,2004 UT App 338
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 267,2004 UT App 338)
trial court's finding that Beckstead had the capacity
to enter a knowing and voluntary plea lacks a
sufficient basis
FN2 Recognizing, as we have, that a
defendant's statements about his or her
alcohol consumption may not be reliable,
we do not intend this opinion to limit a
trial court's ability to employ other means
to ensure a defendant's capacity in the
appropriate circumstances
**11 We conclude that the trial court's knowledge
that Beckstead had been drmkmg prior to the
hearing triggered a duty of further inquiry to strictly
comply with rule 11 Neither Beckstead's
self-evaluation that he was not intoxicated nor his
outward appearance of sobriety was sufficient to
satisfy the court's obligation to ensure that
Beckstead's plea to this felony offense was knowing
and voluntary [FN3] Under these circumstances,
the trial court did not strictly comply with its rule 11
obligations, and should have allowed Beckstead to
withdraw his plea
FN3 A trial court's obligations flowing
from rule 11 are designed to assure
fairness and protect defendants, including
those who choose to consume alcohol
before a court appearance or even attempt
to mislead the court about that alcohol
consumption We note, however, that at
least one other jurisdiction has found such
behavior to be grounds for exercise of the
court's contempt powers See Burradell v
State, 326 Ark 182, 931 S W2d 100, 103
(1996)
CONCLUSION
**12 The trial court was on notice that Beckstead
had been drinking prior to his plea hearing, but took
no steps to determine his level of intoxication or
otherwise establish that Beckstead's guilty plea, and
its accompanying waiver of constitutional rights,
was truly knowing Under these circumstances,
there was an inadequate factual basis upon which
the trial court could conclude that Beckstead was
sufficiently sober to enter a knowing plea, and the

court erred when it denied Beckstead's motion to
withdraw his plea We reverse the trial court's
decision and remand this matter for further
proceedings
**13 I CONCUR
Judge

NORMAN

H

JACKSON,

*272 DAVIS, Judge (dissenting)
**14 I respectfully dissent Although Defendant
argues that the trial court failed to satisfy the
requirements of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure when it accepted his guilty plea,
Defendant's appeal is in essence a collateral
challenge to the trial court's entire rule 11 colloquy
and its later factual finding that Defendant was not
intoxicated at the time he entered his plea
xx

15 The primary purpose of rule 11(e) "is to
insure that when a defendant enters a guilty plea and
thereby waives important constitutional rights,
he
or she acts freely and voluntarily, with full
knowledge of the consequences of the plea" State
v Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 11, 1 P 3d 1108
(quotations and citation omitted)
Moreover,
"[s]tnct compliance with rule 11(e) creates a
presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered"
Id
**16 The trial court clearly complied with the
explicit requirements of rule 11(e) when it
conducted a complete plea colloquy and accepted
Defendant's plea [FN1] By conducting a complete
rule 11 colloquy, the court was able to evaluate
Defendant's responses and observe his demeanor
prior to accepting his plea In addition to the
dialogue from the plea hearing included m the
majority opinion, the following colloquy took place
before the trial court accepted Defendant's plea
FN1 In his opening brief, Defendant
acknowledges that the trial court went
through a complete plea colloquy pursuant
to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure
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Court: All right. Now, anything else we need to
cover before we take the plea, Mr. Beckstead?
Defendant: I just want to have time to get them
[sic] animals and find somebody to take care of
them. I'd appreciate that.
Court: Well, I'm not going to make you a
guarantee. Okay? Would that make a difference?
Defendant: WellCourt: On the plea?
Defendant: Not really.
Court: All right.
Defendant: I am (short inaudible, away from
mic)
Court: All right. To the chargeDefendant:~(short inaudible, no mic) cows. I
don't have anybody to, to take care of them. I just
need to get somebody up to take care of them.
That's all, that's all I'm worried about is the cattle.
Court: All right. To the charge then of driving
under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of
this year, how do you plead?
Defendant: Guilty.
Court: All right. I'll accept that plea.
This extended exchange between the trial court
and Defendant gave the court further opportunity to
determine whether Defendant was able to enter a
knowing plea.
**17 At the hearing on the motion to withdraw,
the court was able to review a tape of the plea
hearing and compare Defendant's demeanor at that
hearing to his demeanor at the motion hearing.
After reviewing the tape, the court found that
Defendant was not intoxicated when he entered his
plea and that his plea was both voluntary and
knowing.
**18 Because the trial court clearly complied with
the requirements of rule 11, Defendant is
essentially left with the claim that the trial court's
finding that Defendant was not intoxicated is
erroneous. This court will "not overturn factual
findings supporting a denial of a motion to
withdraw unless they are clearly erroneous." State
v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,^ 13, 983 P.2d 556.
Defendant has not properly challenged the court's
findings; even if he had, the findings are not clearly
erroneous. The evidence [FN2] in the record

supports the trial court's finding that Defendant was
not intoxicated, and the trial court's findings support
its decision to deny Defendant's motion to withdraw
his plea.
FN2. As the majority noted, the trial judge
reviewed a tape of Defendant's plea and
stated, "I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't
see wavering or, or having trouble standing
up or talking at all. I mean, [he] seemed to
understand all of the questions that I put to
[him] and [his] answers appeared to be
articulate and coherent."
**19 The majority makes much of the fact that the
trial court was on notice that Defendant had
consumed alcohol prior to the hearing; *273
therefore, according to the majority, the trial court
had a heightened responsibility to inquire further
into Defendant's sobriety. Instead of adding new
requirements to the rule 11 procedure, this court
should give due deference to a trial judge's ability to
appraise demeanor evidence. See State v. Hollen,
2002 UT 35,K 64, 44 P.3d 794.
**20 Rather than defer to the trial court's firsthand
observation of Defendant's conduct, the majority,
without
authority,
would
graft
additional
requirements into the rule 11 colloquy when a trial
court is on notice that a defendant has been drinking
alcohol prior to a plea hearing. The majority,
however, fails to define what those requirements
would be or to explain why they would be
appropriate. For example, the majority declares
that at a minimum, the trial court should have
inquired into the amount of alcohol that Defendant
had consumed or the amount of time that had
elapsed since the alcohol consumption. However,
at the same time the majority opinion recognizes
"the well-known tendency of persons to understate
their alcohol intake and level of intoxication when
asked by representatives of the justice system."
Even if there were some basis for this assertion, it
supports the notion that further inquiry into
Defendant's sobriety, against the backdrop of a
thorough rule 11 colloquy, would have revealed
little.
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*21 According to the majority,
neither
Defendant's self-evaluation that he was not
mtoxicated nor his outward appearance of sobriety
was sufficient to satisfy the trial court's obligation to
ensure that Defendant's plea was knowing and
voluntary In concluding that the trial court lacked
an adequate factual basis to determine that
Defendant was not intoxicated, the majority pomts
out that the court "took no steps to determine
[Defendant's] level of intoxication " The majority,
however, fails to demonstrate a legal relationship
between the amount of alcohol consumed by a
defendant and his ability to make a knowing and
voluntary plea Even if a blood-alcohol level were
available, the majority's standard does not
demonstrate how a trial court, without relying on
observation, could determine when a defendant is
so intoxicated that he cannot make a knowing and
voluntary plea
**22 I conclude that the trial court strictly
complied with rule 11 and that it is inappropriate
for this court to add new and undefined
requirements to the rule 11 plea colloquy
Therefore, I would affirm the trial court's denial of
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
100 P3d 267, 509 Utah Adv Rep 26, 2004 UT
App 338
END OF DOCUMENT
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

1

(September 18, 2002)

2
MR. MILES:

3
4

Your Honor, there's one other matter

that Camille has that we could, Larry Beckstead, 41.
THE JUDGE:

5

Forty-one?

All right.

State of

6

Utah versus Larry Beckstead, on for the pretrial conference,

7

case 1020.
MS. NEIDER:

8
9

Judge, in this case a, Mr. Beckstead

was a, cited on June 22nd of this year with another DUI that

10

we weren't aware of until this week.

11

prepared to file that Information in that new case.

12

based on my discussions with a, Mr. Allan, Mr. Beckstead

13

would plead guilty to the new case.

14

the facts better in that case.

15

case.

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MS. NEIDER:

18

So the state's
And

For some reason he liked

And I'll dismiss the old

Okay.
He's been given a copy of the

Information.

19

MR. MILES:

That's correct, Your Honor.

20

THE JUDGE:

All right.

21

MR. MILES:

Mr. Allan, Bernie Allan spoke with

22

him, and that is our understanding.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

prelim and all that?

25

MS. NEIDER:

Now, do we need to have him waive the

Waive the preliminary—

COURT PROCEEDINGS

1

THE JUDGE:

2

MS. NEIDER:

3

Okay.
—

and he'll plead guilty on this

case, Judge Honor.
THE JUDGE:

4

All right.

Do you want to read the

5

Information or just waive the reading of the Information on

6

this new charge?
MR. MILES:

7
8

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

9
10

We'd waive the formal reading,

All right.

It looks like the charge

is driving under the influence of alcohol.

Essentially

1 1 alleges on or about June 22nd, 2002 he operated a motor
12

vehicle and he had a blood alcohol of .08 grams or greater,

13

or he was under the influence or incapable of safely driving

14

a motor vehicle.

15

conviction within 10 years.

And this is his third or subsequent

All right.

16

Right?

And you understand, Mr. Beckstead,

17

you're entitled to have a preliminary hearing on this new

18

charge?

19

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

20

THE JUDGE:

21
22
23
24
25

Yes, sir.

I do.

Did you want to waive your right to

that preliminary hearing?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Yes, sir.

Over the deal we

made with the prosecution.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

And you understand what that

means to waive your right to a prelim?

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

Okay.

Yes, sir.
Does the state have any

objection to the waiver?

4

MS. NEIDER:

5

THE JUDGE:

No objection.
All right.

We'll find that he's

6

freely and voluntarily waived his right to a preliminary

7

hearing.
Now, he wants to enter a guilty plea on this

8
9

matter.

Is that correct?

10

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

11

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Yes, sir.

And I just read to you in

12

essence what the Information or what the elements of the

13

offense are, Mr. Beckstead.

14

If you went to trial on this charge the state would

15

have to prove that you were driving a motor vehicle while

16

under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of 2002 here in

17

Weber County, and they would have to show that you had a

18

blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater, or you

19

were under the influence of alcohol to a degree which

20

rendered you incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, and

21

they would have to prove that you had at least two or more

22

convictions within the last 10 years of driving under the

23

influence.

24

Is that what you did in this case?

25

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Yes, sir.

COURT PROCEEDINGS

THE JUDGE:

1
2

Okay.

Did you want to give me a

factual basis again for what happened here?
MS. NEIDER:

3

Judge, on the new case a, on the date

4

in the Information he was stopped in Harrisville a, and as

5

part of their investigation they thought that he a, might be

6

under the influence of alcohol.

7

breathalyzer and blew a point

.085.

He does have two prior convictions within the time

8
9

He did eventually take a

frame.
THE JUDGE:

10

Okay.

All right.

And,

11

Mr. Beckstead, again you understand that you're not required

12

to plead guilty.

13

has the burden of proof here.

14

would have to prove that to what's called beyond a reasonable

15

doubt.

You're presumed to be innocent.

The state

If you went to trial they

Do you understand that by pleading guilty you're

16
17

going to give up a number of rights that you have.

18

the right to what's called a speedy trial by an impartial

19

]ury.

20

and, of course, Mr. Miles is here with you today.

21

the right against self-incrimination.

You have the right to

22

confront and cross examine witnesses.

You have the right to

23

have witnesses subpoenaed on your own behalf at no expense to

24

you.

25

You have

You have the right to have an attorney represent you
You have

And finally, you have the right of appeal.
You're going to lose all of those by pleading

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

guilty here today.

2

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

3

THE JUDGE:

4

Now, you're not under the influence of

alcohol or drugs here today in court, are you?

5

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MR. MILES:

Mr. Allan was here and he had to leave

so I'm standing in.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

So you had enough time to talk

to Mr. Allan about this?

14

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

15

THE JUDGE:

16

I haven't talked to

Mr. Miles.

12
13

And have you had enough time to talk

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

10
11

No.

to Mr. Miles about this?

8
9

I understand that.

Yes, sir.

And you're satisfied with his

advice?

17

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

18

THE JUDGE:

(No recorded response).

Now you understand we've got this, at

19

least the other case set for trial here it looks like on the

20

26th, and I understand if you plead guilty that's going to be

21

dismissed.

Okay.

22

Now, are you on parole or probation right now?

23

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

No, sir.

Do you understand that this carries a

potential prison term, you could go to prison for this for up

COURT PROCEEDINGS

1

to five years.

It also carries a $5,000 fine and an 85%

2

surcharge on this offense.

Any question about that?

3

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

4

THE JUDGE:

5

No, sir.

All right.

Do you need any more time

to talk to anyone about the case?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

6

If I plead guilty, I'm in

7 was charge of a bunch of livestock on the mountain, I have a,
8

a camp.

9

least two days to get them down and find somebody to take

10

I'd like to have at least a couple of days to, at

care of, take care of the animals if I d o —

11

THE JUDGE:

You're not going to be sentenced

12

today.

I'm going to order what's called a presentence

13

report so you'll have some time between now and—

14

MS. NEIDER:

Judge, the agreement that I had with

15

Mr. Allan was that I was going to ask that he be taken into

16

custody today.

17

THE JUDGE:

18

MS. NEIDER:

19

THE JUDGE:

21

MS. NEIDER:

Okay.
And frankly, he's been drinking today

and a, that concerns me.

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MS. NEIDER:

25

The reason for that was, otherwise,

otherwise he would have been felony on felony.

20

22

Oh.

You say he has been drinking today?
I can tell he's been drinking.

I can

smell it.

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

THE JUDGE:

2

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

3

THE JUDGE:

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

13

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

THE JUDGE:

20
21

but you have been drinking.
I have a little bit of a

Well, I do too but I don't drink to

take care of it, so...

17

19

—

back problem.

15

18

No (short inaudible, two

speakers) this morning.
THE"JUDGE:

16

You're not under the influence

of alcohol—

12

14

I'm not under the influence,

Your Honor.

10
11

Well, I just asked you if you had had

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

8
9

Well, it was early this

anything to drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you said no.

6
7

—

morning.

4
5

I thought I just asked you Mr.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

(Short inaudible, away from

mic) .
THE JUDGE:

All right.

Now, anything else we

need to cover before we take the plea, Mr. Beckstead?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I just want to have time to

22

get them animals and find somebody to take care of them.

23

appreciate that.

24
25

THE JUDGE:
guarantee.

Okay?

Well, I'm not going to make you a
Would that make a difference?

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

4

THE JUDGE:

5

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

6

On the plea?

I am (short inaudible, away

from mic).
THE JUDGE:

8

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

10

Not really.

All right.

7

9

Well—

cows.

All right.

To the charge—
—

(short inaudible, no mic)

I don't have anybody to, to take care of them.

need to get somebody up to take care of them.

I just

That's all,

1 1 that's all I'm worried about is the cattle.
THE JUDGE:

12

All right.

To the charge then of

13

driving under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of this

14

year, how do you plead?

15

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

16

THE JUDGE:

Guilty.

All right.

I'll accept that plea.

17

And then you're going to move to dismiss the other case

18

that's pending?

19

MS. NEIDER:

20

THE JUDGE:

21

1020.

MS. NEIDER:

23

THE JUDGE:

25

And that is the case that ends in

It's also driving under the influence of alcohol.

22

24

Yes, Judge.

Yes, Judge.
All right.

We'll accept that plea

and we'll also dismiss the other case.
Now, do we need sentencing date on this?

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

October 23rd.

2

THE JUDGE:

October 23rd.

3

All right.

Now, do we need to address this

Okay.

4

question of whether or not we leave him out awaiting

5

sentencing?
MS. NEIDER:

6

Judge that was my a, that's what I

7

told Mr. Allan that I would be requesting.

Otherwise, he

8

would be out on a felony on felony and we could have just

9

tried that other case next week.

I know he wants time to

10

handle this livestock problem.

But frankly, I think in

11

the interests of safety of the public he be taken into

12

custody.

13

MR. MILES:

14

that she spoke with Mr. Allan.

15

asking, from what he indicates it would just be a day or two

16

to get arrangements made b u t —

17

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

18

MR. MILES:

19

—

I, I guess we wouldn't be

Just two days, Your Honor.

we'll submit it to, to

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

20
21

Your Honor, and I, and I understand

Mr. Beckstead, have you got somebody

else that can take care of your situation?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

22

I've got to go, I've got to

23

go out to (inaudible word) valley and find out if I can get

24

the co-owner, co-owner to take over his share of them, I

25

guess.

I know this is, this is...

I hadn't expected this.

rnnRrP DcncppnTMr.!;

1

I expected to go to Harrisville and (short inaudible, away

2

from mic) down there to a Class B Misdemeanor, which is what

3

they offered me.

And (short indecipherable, away mic) right

4 off the top of my head I don't know what I'm going to do
5

here.
THE JUDGE:

6

Now I guess, my question is have you

7 got somebody else that can take of your—
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

8
9

Not immediately, no.

I've

got to find somebody.

10

THE JUDGE:

Do you have family here?

11

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

14

THE JUDGE:

Uh-uh (negative).

Friends?
My family all...

No.

Well, I tell you what, what troubles

15

me is the fact that you were out awaiting trial for a DUI and

16

then you commit the one you just pled guilty to.

17

show up in my court drinking.

18

time bomb, aren't you.

19

a little remiss?

21

24
25

Your Honor, all I'm asking

is 48 hours (short inaudible, two speakers).
THE JUDGE:

22
23

I mean, you are an absolute

If I, if I let you go aren't I being

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

20

And now you

Well, I know what you're asking but, I

mean—
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

And this was part of the

agreement which I've made with the prosecution, that I'd have

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

time to take care of this.
THE JUDGE:

2

I know.

But I'm just a little

3

concerned about, I'm troubled over somebody who's awaiting

4

trial for a drinking offense, and then you commit a new one

5 while you're out there.
6 out free on bail.

I mean, I gave you the chance to be

And now you've committed a new crime. And

7

now you show up in my court drinking.

8

kind of trying to figure out how, why I should let you go is

9

what I'm concerned about.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

10
11

And I'm just, I'm

I'm not thinking of myself,

Your Honor.

12

THE JUDGE:

13

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

14

because (short inaudible, two speakers).
THE JUDGE:

15
16
17
18

What?
I'm not thinking of myself

Well I know that, that's pretty

obvious.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

(Short inaudible, two

speakers)—

19

THE JUDGE:

What I'm worried about is those—

20

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

21

THE JUDGE:

—

—

obligation o f —

people out in Weber County that

22

run the risk of having you run into them.

23

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

I'm not driving today.

Do you have anything else, Mr. Miles,

that you wanted to say?

COURT PROCEEDINGS

MR. MILES:

1

Your Honor, I'm a little tied because

2

I believe that was what Bernie and her indicated.

3

know Mr. Beckstead wanted to inquire about a couple days.
THE JUDGE:

4

But I

Well, Mr. Beckstead, I'm going to

5

revoke your bail and have you taken into custody.

6

understand your situation, but this is just too dangerous to

7

leave you out with this kind of a situation.
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

8
9

THE JUDGE:

11

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

12

THE JUDGE:

No.

No.

going to prison on this.

16

anymore.

17

now made it a felony so.

Okay?

This is not some misdemeanor

You've got so many priors that you've now, you've

All right.

18

21

I've got you scheduled for

So you understand, Mr. Beckstead, you could be

15

20

To take care of this?

sentencing on October 23rd.

14

19

Is there possibly a furlow

for 24 hours, to get out for 24 hours?

10

13

I

Okay?

We'll see you on October 23rd.

2:00 o'clock.
We'll strike that trial date then.
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

22
23
24
25
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(March 5, 2003)

2
3

MR. LAKER:

This is Larry Beckstead, Your Honor.

4

THE JUDGE:

All right.

This was on, I guess

5

there was, it was a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, was

6

there not?

7
8

MR. LAKER:

Yes, Your Honor.

Actually what

happened was, was that he filed a, a pro se written motion.

9

THE JUDGE:

Right.

10

MR. LAKER:

You ruled that that was, was adequate.

11

THE JUDGE:

Right.

12

MR. LAKER:

You pulled me out of another court and

13

I came over.

And apparently you told me to a, to do... My

14

recollection was you told me to talk to Mr. Allan about this,

15

which I remembered doing.

16

file a formal motion to withdraw.

17

that.

But I did not in a timely fashion
I have subsequently done

18

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

19

MR. LAKER:

And so we're here for oral argument.

20

I need to let the Court know that a, Ms. Neider and

21

I have been downstairs, we've reviewed the tape of the

22

plea.

23
24
25

I don't know whether the Court has done that as well.
THE JUDGE:

It's right here.

Yes, I've looked at

MR. LAKER:

There isn't any question, Your Honor,

it.
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1 on the tape that a, that, that Mr. Beckstead had been
2

drinking.

3

Camille Neider points that out.

4

actually points that out.

5

I think Your Honor points that out, I think
I think the defendant

I think the question really becomes whether or not

6

he was quote unquote intoxicated to the place that he could

7

not understand what he was doing.

8
9
10

In the colloquy to my, you know, what I remember
hearing is, is that you sort of chewed Mr. Beckstead out
because he had just got through answering you are you under

1 1 the influence of any alcohol or drugs—
12

THE JUDGE:

Right.

13

MR. LAKER:

—

14

THE JUDGE:

Right.

15

MR. LAKER:

And a, and then Mrs. Neider pointed

and he said no.

16

out that he'd, that a, she felt like he'd been drinking.

17

And he stated that he had, that he had had something to

18

drink.

19

THE JUDGE:

Right.

20

MR. LAKER:

And you chewed him out because you

21

said he'd just, just said he hadn't.

And his response to

22

you was you asked me if I was, if, if I was under the

23

influence, not whether I'd been drinking.

24

THE JUDGE:

Right.

25

MR. LAKER:

And a, at this point in time he's
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1 alleging that a, not only had he been drinking but he was,
2 had been drinking a sufficient quantity to be intoxicated and
3 didn't understand what he was doing.
4

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

So your, your thinking is

5 what, that he didn't enter a knowing plea, knowingly?
6

MR. LAKER:

Yes. That's, that's our position—

7

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

8

MR. LAKER:

—

9
10

plea because he was intoxicated at the time.
THE JUDGE:

11

wanted to add?

12

his motion and—

13

is that he did not enter a knowing

All right.

Ms. Neider, anything you

I did have a chance to read your response to

MR. SNIDER:

Judge, I don't think there's anything

14 on the tape that shows that it was anything but a knowing and
15

voluntary plea.

I think that he was definitely coherent and

16

answered your questions.

17

doesn't seem to be swaying.

18

tape that would support his position now that he was

19

intoxicated.

He a, responds appropriately.

He

There's nothing evident on the

20

And frankly, we're prepared to have Mr. Allan come

21

over and testify if necessary, Judge, that it was his belief

22

that he wasn't intoxicated.

23

Court wants.

24

see that that would add anything other than a, what was there

25

and what the Court could see.

And we can still do that if the

But after reviewing the tape, Judge, I don't

COURT PROCEEDINGS

I just don't think there's anything in his motion
that rises to the level of good cause.

We would ask that

you deny his motion then.
THE JUDGE:

All right.

Anything else,

MR. LAKER:

Anything you want to say?

Mr. Laker?

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

Just that the officer that

was here when I was arrested said you've not only been
drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years,
and he said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and
took me downstairs.

I said do you want to give me a

breathalyzer (short inaudible, away from mic), because they
were going to charge me with public intox (short inaudible,
away from mic).
THE JUDGE:

Well, you know, I think the real

question is not whether you had been drinking, but as
Mr. Laker points out whether or not you were intoxicated,
whether you were so impaired that you didn't understand what
you were doing at the time you stood here in court and
entered a guilty plea.

That's, that's the real issue here.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

And after I sobered up

understood how I messed up, Your Honor.

I

I should have never

done that.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

And the state had promised
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1 but never came through anyway.

But as far as, this is as far

2 as I remember, my plea bargain went out the window also
3 because I was arrested and intoxicated.
4

THE JUDGE:

5

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

6

What do you mean by that, I don't—

been given some time to get my things together, a couple

7 days, so forth and so on.
8

Well, I was supposed to have

jail time.

There was mention of a minimum

All that went out the, out the door when

9 Mr. Allan left apparently.

This is what I recall.

I'm not,

10

you know, when after he left and I pled guilty, the

11

prosecutor turned and asked that you place me in custody then

12

because I had been, I was intoxicated or had been drinking

13

that day.
THE JUDGE:

14

Okay.

Well, the problem I'm having

15

is there's no doubt that you'd been drinking.

16

finally admitted that. Although initially when I asked you

17

that at the time of the plea—

18

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

19

THE JUDGE:

21

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

23

Well nobody, nobody wants to

agree—

20

22

I mean, you

Right.
—

you know, it's a public

embarrassment.
THE JUDGE:

But, but the question is whether or

24

not you had consumed so much alcohol that you didn't

25

appreciate, I guess, or understand what you were doing at the
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1 time you entered your guilty plea.
2

looked at the tape again.
And as I look at the tape I don,' t see anything on

3
4

And, and that's why I

the, the tape that suggests to me that you were impaired.

5 And I didn't notice anything at the time we took the plea.

I

6 mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or,
7 or having trouble standing up or talking at all.

I mean,

8

you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to

9

you and your answers appeared to be articulate and

10

coherent.

So I think the fact that maybe you had something

11

to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your

12

ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did.
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11.

13
14

I'm also going to find that the plea in this case was both

15

voluntary and knowing.

16

just don't think that you were under the influence of an

17

alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of

18

understanding what was going on that day.

And you may have been drinking but I

And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time,

19
20

sir, to withdraw the plea.

21

imposed.

And we'll leave the sentence

22

Now, you do have the right to appeal that—

23

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

—

We are going to appeal, yes.

and 30 days—
Yes.
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1

THE JUDGE:

—

2

MR. LAKER:

He has, he has asked me, Your Honor,

to file a notice.

3

to ask the Court for a post sentence relief, a release

4

pending, pending appeal at this time.

5

THE JUDGE:

6

motion at this time.

7

appeal s o —

Well, I'm going to deny that

But you do have 30 days to file an

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

8
9

Okay.

now?

10

THE JUDGE:

11

writing though within 30 d a y s —

Yes.

You need it file something in

12

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

Can I orally file that right

—

I have.

but you certainly can put that on

the record that you want to appeal the ruling.

15

DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

16

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

17

MR. LAKER:

Are you going to handle that appeal

18
19

Okay.

through your lawyers at the prison?
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD:

I'm not sure how we're going

20

to do this.

If you can file an appeal and get it done then

21

I'm sure maybe we can have somebody pick it up.

22

how fast I can get the paperwork done in prison and appeal,

23

file it, if I can do it in 30 days.

I don't know

24

MR. LAKER:

We'll file a notice of appeal.

25

THE JUDGE:

All right.

That will be all then.
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1 Good luck to you.
2

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

3
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12
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13
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14
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15
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16

pages numbered 59 through 68, inclusive except where it is

17
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Addendum C

77-13-& Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch.
16, § 1.

Page 2 of 40

VMestkw;
UTRRCRPRulell

Page 1

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11

C
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
-•RULE 11. PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant
waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill.
A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to
plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to
make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the
defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the
plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does
not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime
was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability,
that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature
of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
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(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has
been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents
of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement
has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise concerning any
collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved
by the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that
any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by the
prosecuting attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the
disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be
approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge
shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be
allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the
court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to detennine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any variance from the
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply
with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002;
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